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B I myself have invented a game. Well, think of a number.
A I got a number.
B Me too. Now, tell me yours.
A Seven.
B Seven. Mine is eight – I won.
Sergey Solovyov, Assa (conversation of Bananan and Alika)
Abstract
We discuss variations of the zero-sum game where Bob selects two
distinct numbers, and Alice learns one of them to make a guess which
of the numbers is the larger.
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1 Introduction.
To play a guessing game, Bob takes two cards and on each writes a different
number. Alice randomly chooses one of these cards and peeks at the number.
She must then decide which of the numbers is the larger: the number in her
hand or the other, concealed number. She wins each time her guess is correct.
By blind guessing Alice wins with probability 1/2. Interestingly, there
is a better strategy. The idea is to compare the observed number x with a
threshold number t, sampled from some probability distribution, for instance
the normal. If x ≥ t the strategy accepts x as the larger number of two on
the cards, otherwise rejects x and decides that the concealed number is the
larger. By symmetry, Alice is right or wrong with the same probability, if t
falls either above or below both Bob’s numbers. But if t falls between the two
numbers, the decision is correct for sure: the observed x will be accepted if it
is the larger number and rejected otherwise. The advantage of the strategy is
due to the latter possibility, which has nonzero probability whichever Bob’s
numbers happen to be.
For many people this appears counter-intuitive, since a random choice
from two unknown numbers seems to bear no information on how the num-
bers compare to one another. The history of the paradox can be traced back
to the work on theoretical statistics by David Blackwell [2] and Bruce Hill
[17]. Much of the interest was sparked by Tom Cover’s [8] half-page abstract,
where the game framework was explicitly introduced. Steve Samuels [26] no-
ticed that the game belongs to the circle of questions around Martin Gard-
ner’s Game of Googol and Secretary Problem, where the guessing player aims
to stop at the maximum of a sequence of unknown numbers observed in ran-
dom order [1, 10, 27]. The conundrum was popularised by Thomas Bruss [5]
and Ted Hill [18], and many further fascinating connections with the classical
probability problems were subsequently found [4, 11, 12, 14, 15, 19, 25, 31].
From the perspective of the zero-sum game theory the guessing game is
fair, and the blind guessing is an equalising minimax strategy. The advan-
tage of a threshold strategy over blind guessing is an interesting dominance
phenomenon that cannot occur in games with finitely many pure strategies.
Bob has no minimax strategy, and so the game has no solution although has
a definite value. The latter means that Bob is capable of keeping Alice’s
advantage arbitrarily small.
A common fallacy associated with the game is that a smart strategy for
Bob were choosing the numbers close to one another. This recipe is good
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to keep the advantage of a randomised threshold strategy small, but may
fail when Alice uses some other strategy. For instance, if Bob employs a
pure game strategy involving any two given numbers, then Alice can respond
with a sure-fire guessing. Much more importantly, Bob should really take
care of that the odds given the observed number are about equal. Such
epsilon-minimax strategies for the number-writing player have been designed
in [1, 10, 11, 12].
In this paper we discuss strategies for both players, thus giving a complete
account of the game. In particular, we will characterise all Alice’s minimax
strategies, that guarantee the winning probability 1/2. We shall also consider
variations of the game by granting the number-writing player different pow-
ers, to stress the roles of the admissible number range and exchangeability
implied by random choice of a card. On this way we will introduce a more
involved game with two piles of cards. In the new game Bob takes, let’s say,
52 cards and on each writes a different number. The cards are turned face
down, shuffled and dealt in two piles of given sizes. Alice collects the first
pile, opens the cards and guesses if the number largest of all 52 numbers is
in her hand or in the second pile. This can be regarded as a version of the
Game of Googol, where the stopping player has some return options. We
will see that properties of the two-pile game largely depend on whether the
deck is divided evenly or not. If Alice gets exactly half of the deck, she can
take some advantage from learning the numbers by employing a threshold
strategy, just like in the game with two cards. If the piles are of different
size, Bob has a smart way to generate the numbers, such that even if Alice
finds out his algorithm, she cannot do better than with the obvious strategy
of betting on the bigger pile.
Although the paper is mostly self-contained, we shall assume the reader
is familiar with random variables and probability distributions on the level of
a ‘second course’ in probability or statistics. For fundamentals of the game-
theoretic approach to statistical decision theory we refer to the classic text
[3].
2 The general setting
Before embarking on a discussion of the paradox it is helpful to consider a
wider framework for the guessing games. Suppose that the revealed number
x and the concealed number y are sample values of two random variables X
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and Y, respectively. We assume P (X = Y ) = 0, that probability of a ‘tie’ is
zero, i.e. the numbers are different and so one of them is always the larger
and the other is the smaller. The joint probability distribution of the pair
X, Y is a strategy for Bob. The rules of a particular game specify, sometimes
implicitly, a class of joint distributions that Bob is allowed to use. The rules
of the game belong to the common knowledge of players.
Having observed a value x, Alice is willing to guess which of the numbers
is the larger. If she decides by tossing a fair coin, she is right with probability
1/2. Whether there are better strategies depends on the rules of the game.
A pure strategy for Alice will be identified with a set D ⊂ R called a
decision set. According to strategy D, the observed number x is accepted as
the larger if and only if x ∈ D. To be able to define probabilities associated
will the strategy we will assume that the set D is Borel.
Alice has two pure blind guessing strategies: one with D = R always
accepting x, and the other with D = ∅ always rejecting x. A pure threshold
strategy has D = [t,∞) with some fixed threshold t.
Example A It is easy to find a solution to the unconstrained game, where the
joint distribution forX, Y can be arbitrary. Then playing X = 0 and Y = ±1
with equal probabilities, Bob achieves that Alice wins with probability 1/2
no matter how she decides. Thus 1/2 is the value of this game.
Example B The game is more interesting when Bob is in some way re-
stricted in choosing the joint distribution for X, Y. In the arrangement game
introduced in [14] he is given two numbers sampled independently from the
uniform distribution on [0, 1], but may choose which of the numbers is shown
to Alice. The property characterising the relevant class of distributions is
that the pair X, Y arranged in increasing order has uniform distribution on
{(a, b) : 0 < a < b < 1}. Still, Bob has an equalising strategy: show the num-
ber which is closer to 1/2. By symmetry of the uniform distribution about
the median, the hidden number is equally likely to be bigger or smaller than
the shown number.
In line with the paradigm of the zero-sum game theory, when choosing a
strategy Bob should expect Alice’s response most favourable for her. The best
response is an optimal strategy in a Bayesian decision problem, where Alice
knows exactly the joint distribution of X, Y and can inambiguously evaluate
strategies to find the one with the highest winning probability. Having ob-
served x, she will be able to calculate the conditional probability of winning
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by accepting the number in hand, that is
π(x) := P (X > Y |X = x) = P (Y ≤ x|X = x).
If she plays pure strategy D, the total probability of the correct guess is equal
to
P (X > Y,X ∈ D) + P (X < Y,X ∈ Dc) =
E[π(X)1(X ∈ D) + (1− π(X))1(X ∈ Dc)],
where 1(· · · ) equals 1 if · · · is true and equals 0 otherwise, Dc is the comple-
ment of set D and E denotes the expectation. The random variable π(X) is
obtained by substituting X in the function π : R→ [0, 1], so the distribution
of π(X) is determined by the joint distribution of X, Y. A minute reflection
shows that the total probability of the correct guess will be maximised if
Alice accepts x when π(x) > 1/2, and rejects x when π(x) < 1/2; while
decision in the case π(x) = 1/2 can be arbitrary1. Playing so, when X = x
she will be right with probability
max(π(x), 1− π(x)) =
1
2
+
∣∣∣∣π(x)− 12
∣∣∣∣ ,
hence the overall probability of the correct guess becomes
v :=
1
2
+ E
∣∣∣∣π(X)− 12
∣∣∣∣ . (1)
Note that the maximal probability v is achieved by a pure strategy D = {x :
π(x) ≥ 1/2}. But if π(X) assumes value 1/2 with positive probability, there
are also mixed strategies, with randomised decision set, that achieve (1).
A useful related concept is the median of the conditional distribution of
Y given that X = x
µ(x) = inf
{
y : P (Y ≤ y|X = x) ≥
1
2
}
.
In view of inequality
P (Y ≤ µ(x)|X = x) ≥
1
2
1In fact, optimality of this strategy is a consequence of the principle of dynamic pro-
gramming.
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the optimal decision set can be determined by the condition
x ≥ µ(x). (2)
Example C Here is an important example. Suppose X and Y are inde-
pendent and identically distributed (iid) with some known continuous dis-
tribution. The Bayesian decision problem is then the simplest case of the
Full-Information Secretary Problem [27]. By independence π(x) = P (Y ≤
x) = P (X ≤ x) is the common cumulative distribution function, and the ran-
dom variable π(X) is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] (the fact known as the
probability integral transform). Since |π(X)− 1/2| is uniformly distributed
on [0, 1/2], formula (1) readily yields v = 3/4. The conditional median is
a constant µ obtained as the minimal solution to the equation π(t) = 1/2.
Alice’s optimal strategy is of the threshold type, with threshold coinciding
with the median.
3 The paradox of two cards
3.1 Threshold strategies
We turn now to Tom Cover’s game, where Alice picks a card at random.
This has the effect of exchangeability [7], meaning that permutation Y,X has
the same joint distribution as X, Y. In terms of the bivariate distribution
function, exchangeability holds if
P (X ≤ x, Y ≤ y) = P (Y ≤ x,X ≤ y)
for all x, y. In particular, the random variables X and Y are identically
distributed and P (X > Y ) = P (Y > X) = 1/2. A pure strategy for Bob
in this game can be modeled as a pair of fixed numbers a, b with a < b, so
that the associated exchangeable variables X, Y are these numbers arranged
in random order.
We note in passing that if X and Y are iid (as in Example C) then they
are exchangeable, but exchangeability and independence are very different
properties. Thus for iid X, Y the ‘no tie’ condition P (X = Y ) = 0 means
that P (X = x) = 0 for every x, that is the distribution of X is continuous.
In contrast to that, exchangeability does not rule out discrete distributions,
e.g. for each Bob’s pure strategy the range of X has two elements.
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Suppose Alice employs a randomisation device to generate a sample value
t of random variable T . To exclude cooperation between the players, as
inherent to the zero-sum game, we shall assume that T is independent of
X, Y . The associated threshold strategy accepts x if x ≥ t, and rejects x
otherwise. By independence and exchangeability the triple T,X, Y has the
same joint distribution as T, Y,X, thus
P (X ≥ T, Y ≥ T,X > Y ) = P (X ≥ T, Y ≥ T, Y > X) =
1
2
P (X ≥ T, Y ≥ T ),
P (X < T, Y < T, Y > X) =
1
2
P (X < T, Y < T ),
P (X < T ≤ Y ) = P (Y < T ≤ X) =
1
2
P (X < T ≤ Y ) +
1
2
P (Y < T ≤ X).
Summing probabilities on the right-hand side yields 1/2, hence adding to
the sum P (Y < T ≤ X) the probability of correct guess with the threshold
strategy becomes
w :=
1
2
+ P (Y < T ≤ X). (3)
Strict inequality w > 1/2 is ensured (for arbitrary distribution of X, Y )
if T is fully supported, i.e. with cumulative distribution function
F (t) = P (T ≤ t) (4)
strictly increasing for t ∈ R. The latter condition is equivalent to
P (a < T ≤ b)) = F (b)− F (a) > 0
for all a < b, which is true whenever T has everywhere positive density.
Observe that formula (3) is valid under a weaker assumption that T,X, Y
have the same joint distribution as T, Y,X (that is, X, Y are conditionally
exchangeable given a value of T ). The case where all three variables T,X, Y
are exchangeable suggests the following variation of the game, in the spirit
of Secretary Problem with a ‘training sample’ [6].
Example D For readers unfamiliar with the Secretary Problem this appli-
cation of (3) might appear even more surprising than the paradox of two
cards. Suppose Bob writes three distinct numbers on separate cards, which
are shuffled and dealt face down in a row. Alice turns face up the first and the
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second card, and must then guess if the number on the second card is larger
than a concealed number on the third card. Using the number on the first
card as a threshold to compare with the number on the second card, Alice
wins with probability w = 1/2+P (Y < T < X) = 1/2+1/6 = 2/3, because
due to exchangeability all 3! = 6 rankings of T,X, Y are equally likely. This
example stresses the role of exchangeability in affecting the odds. Although
three numbers are a priori unknown, Alice can substantially benefit from
comparing the first two.
For any given joint distribution of X, Y the best of threshold strategies
has nonrandom threshold found by maximising P (Y < t ≤ X). To make
this probability positive, t must lie between supremum and infinum of the
range of X, although for some such t the probability can be zero2. For
instance, if Bob plays a mixture of pure strategies 1, 2 and 7, 8 we will have
P (Y < t ≤ X) = 0 for t = 5. If X and Y are not iid, typically the optimal
threshold does not coincide with the median of X.
3.2 A probability inequality
Once the first surprise is over, one might attempt explaining the paradox by
arguing that the bigger the observed number x, the more likely it is the larger.
However, exchangeability beats intuition also in this respect. Contrary to the
iid case, in general the conditional probability π(x) is neither increasing in x,
nor even exceeds 1/2 for all sufficiently big x. As a consequence, the optimal
Alice’s counter-strategy against X, Y with given distribution may not be of
the threshold type.
Example E Here is an example of erratic behaviour. For every integer j
there is a pure strategy for Bob with numbers 3j, 3j + 1. Take a mixture
of these pure strategies with some positive weights, that is pick j from any
probability distribution on the set of integers, then arrange the numbers 3j
and 3j+1 in random order. For X, Y thus defined, π(x) = 0 for x a multiple
of 3, but π(x) = 1 for x = 1 modulo 3. Obviously, Alice’s best response
is not a threshold strategy, rather a sure-fire strategy deciding that x > y
whenever x = 1 modulo 3, so with decision set D = {3j + 1 : j ∈ Z}.
A similar example illustrates that P (X > Y |X ≥ t) need not be increas-
ing in t. What is the correct intuition, is that the message ‘the observed
2The assertion on top of p. 290 in [26] needs to be corrected.
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number exceeds a threshold’ increases the likelihood of the event X > Y ,
because X is certainly the larger when the hidden number falls below the
threshold, whereas the variables are indistinguishable otherwise. Likewise,
the message ‘the observed number falls below a threshold’ speaks against
X > Y because the hidden number may still exceed the threshold. Formally,
this conditional probability in focus is at least 1/2, which is precisely the
inequality underlying the paradox. We will show this for a random threshold
T independent of exchangeable X and Y . Indeed,
P (X > Y,X ≥ T ) = P (X > Y,X ≥ T, Y ≥ T ) + P (X > Y,X ≥ T, Y < T )
=
1
2
P (X ≥ T, Y ≥ T ) + P (Y < T ≤ X)
=
1
2
{P (X ≥ T, Y ≥ T ) + P (Y < T ≤ X)}+
1
2
P (Y < T ≤ X)
=
1
2
P (X ≥ T ) +
1
2
P (Y < T ≤ X).
Assuming that P (X ≥ T ) > 0 we arrive at
P (X > Y |X ≥ T ) =
1
2
+
1
2
P (Y < T |X ≥ T ) ≥
1
2
, (5)
where the bound is strict if P (Y < T ≤ X) > 0 .
To conclude, given the observed number exceeds a threshold, betting that
this number is the larger is, overall, favourable. However, for a particular x,
no matter how large, the bet may turn unfavourable.
Similarly, a negative outcome of the threshold comparison reduces the
likelihood
P (X > Y |X < T ) =
1
2
−
1
2
P (Y ≥ T |X < T ) ≤
1
2
.
This obvious counterpart of (5) will be useful in what follows to introduce
deformations of threshold strategy.
There are several variations on the theme how comparison with a thresh-
old affects ranking. One generalisation of (5) is the following. Let X1, . . . , Xn
be exchangeable random variables without ties. The rank R of X1 is defined
as the number of Xj ’s not greater than X1. By exchangeability the dis-
tribution of R is uniform on n integers. Now, it can be shown that for T
independent threshold, condition X1 > T increases the probability of R > k
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for every k = 1, . . . , n−1. That is to say, the information that a number cho-
sen at random out of n numbers exceeds a threshold stochastically increases
the rank of this number. See [15] for applications of relations akin to (5) in
optimal stopping.
3.3 T. Hill’s finite game
In the wonderful expository article [18] Ted Hill invites the reader to solve
a guessing game where Bob is only allowed to use integer numbers from 1
to, let us say, m + 1. This game reduces to a finite game, i.e. with finite
sets of pure strategies for both players, because for Alice it is sufficient to
use decision sets D ⊂ {1, . . . , m+1}. For the finite game the celebrated von
Neumann’s Minimax Theorem ensures that the game has a solution3.
Define a mixed strategy for Bob by choosing β uniformly from the set of
integers 1, 2, . . . , m. Given β, the variables X, Y are the numbers β, β + 1
arranged in random order. One can think of sampling a coin from a bag of
m coins with labels β, β + 1 on the sides, then tossing the coin and noting
a number x on the upper side. The resulting joint distribution of X, Y is
uniform on the set of 2m integer pairs
{(β, β + 1) : 1 ≤ β ≤ m} ∪ {(β + 1, β) : 1 ≤ β ≤ m}. (6)
When the observed number is some 1 < x < m+ 1 both options β = x and
β = x− 1 are equally likely, that is
P (X = x) = P (X = x, Y = x+ 1) + P (X = x, Y = x− 1) =
1
m
and
π(x) =
P (X = x, Y = x− 1)
P (X = x)
=
1
2
.
For the extremes we have
P (X = 1) = P (X = m+ 1) =
1
2m
3Ted Hill provokes with a fallacious argument: ‘it also seems obvious that the number-
writer would never write a 1, since if [Alice turns] over a 1, [she] will always win by [not
choosing 1]. But if he never writes a 1, he then would never write a 2 either since he never
wrote a 1, and so on ad absurdum’.
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and π(1) = 0, π(m + 1) = 1. Thus (1) gives the total probability of win by
the best response
v =
1
2
+
1
2m
∣∣∣∣0− 12
∣∣∣∣ + (m− 1) · 1m · 0 + 12m
∣∣∣∣1− 12
∣∣∣∣ = 12 + 12m.
Define a threshold strategy for Alice with T uniformly distributed over
the set {2, . . . , m+1}. Whichever distinct x, y from {1, . . . , m+1}, the larger
of them belongs to {2, . . . , m+1}. Thus, whichever Bob’s strategy the event
T = max(X, Y ) is independent of X, Y and has probability 1/m. It follows
that probability (3) can be estimated as
w ≥
1
2
+ P (Y < T = X) =
1
2
+ P (Y < X, T = max(X, Y )) =
1
2
+ P (Y < X)P (T = max(X, Y )) =
1
2
+
1
2m
.
We see that Alice can guarantee 1/2 + 1/(2m), while Bob has a strategy to
bound her winning probability by this very value. It follows that 1/2+1/(2m)
is the value of the finite game, and that the described strategies of players
are minimax.
Next, assuming that Bob can employ arbitrary integer numbers, we are
in the situation where each player has infinitely many pure strategies, hence
the Minimax Theorem cannot guarantee existence of the value. However,
letting m → ∞ in the finite game, it is clear that Bob can keep Alice’s
winning probability as close to 1/2 as desired. On the other hand, since for
the optimal Alice’s counter-strategy v ≥ w > 1/2, where w is the winning
probability for some threshold strategy, Bob cannot achieve 1/2 exactly. This
implies that the game with integer numbers has value 1/2.
But then 1/2 is also the value in the game where Bob can use arbitrary
real numbers. Bob has no minimax strategy and so the guessing game with
real numbers has no solution.
In contrast to the game on integers, restricting Bob’s numbers to a finite
interval will not change the quantitative picture. Indeed, monotonic functions
preserve the order relation hence the game with arbitrary real numbers can
be transformed in equivalent game where the range of X, Y is bounded. The
interval supporting X, Y can be as small as wanted.
To disprove a common belief, we notice that Bob also has good strategies
where |X − Y | is big. For instance, he can play a mixture of pure strategies
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βk, β(k+1), with β sampled from the uniform distribution on {1, . . . , m} and
k fixed. Such a strategy is epsilon-minimax for k/m sufficiently small. The
latter does not exclude that k = |X−Y | itself is a big number, nevertherless
any random threshold T will fall rarely between X and Y .
3.4 Minimax and admissible strategies
Game-theoretically, both pure blind-guessing strategies with decision sets R
and∅, respectively, are optimal (i.e. minimax) as they ensure the value of the
game 1/2. The same applies to any randomised blind guessing, e.g. deciding
by tossing a fair coin. However, every pure threshold strategy D = [t,∞) is
minimax as well, and dominates blind guessing. A mixed threshold strategy
with fully supported T strongly dominates the blind guessing, in the sense
that P (win) > 1/2 no matter how Bob plays. This bizarre dominance phe-
nomenon cannot occur in finite games, where a strictly dominated strategy
cannot be minimax.
In a discussion that came after the prize-winning article [5], Thomas Bruss
and Tom Cover raised the following natural questions:
(i) Is the guessing strategy that always succeeds with probability strictly
greater than 1/2 a threshold strategy?
(ii) What is an optimal strategy? Is it of the threshold type?
(iii) What could be an alternative to threshold comparison, to benefit from
learning one of the numbers?
Question (i) is answered in negative by means of a very simple construc-
tion. With every guessing strategy one can associate a dual strategy, which
always makes the opposite decision. When the strategy wins the dual loses
and vice versa. Taking a mixture of a threshold strategy and its dual, with
weights, say, 3/4 and 1/4 (respectively), we obtain a strategy winning with
probability still greater than 1/2. However, this example is not very exciting,
because the mixture is dominated by the threshold strategy.
To answer two other questions one needs to be precise about the class
of feasible guessing strategies, and especially about the very concept of ran-
domised strategy. Once the framework is established, one should in the first
instance focus on admissible (undominated) guessing strategies, i.e. those
which cannot be improved in all situations, because the ‘optimal’ strategies
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must be among admissible whatever ‘optimality’ means. A minimax guess-
ing strategy will be called superminimax if for any Bob’s play the strategy
wins with probability strictly greater than 1/2 and is admissible. In response
to the Bruss-Cover questions we will give a complete characterisation of the
superminimax strategies. In particular, we will show that every admissi-
ble minimax strategy, in all what concerns its performance, is equivalent to
a threshold strategy, and so from the optimisation viewpoint the class of
threshold strategies is sufficient. With the reservation that there are many
equivalent strategies, the answer to (iii) is ‘no alternative’.
3.5 Characterising superminimax strategies
Let us first recall some terminology. For D˜ and D decision sets, we say
that Alice’s pure strategy D˜ dominates D if for every strategy of Bob the
probability of win with D˜ is at least as great as with D, and there exists
Bob’s strategy such that the probability is strictly greater. We say that
D˜ strongly dominates D if the probability of win with D˜ is always strictly
greater than that with D. A guessing strategy is called admissible if no
other strategy dominates it. For the purpose of checking dominance it is
sufficient to compare the outcomes when Bob plays a pure strategy, because
the general case follows by computing averages. To verify admissibility of
Alice’s strategy one needs, in general, to make comparisons of outcomes also
under mixed strategies of Bob.
The game in ‘normal form’ is specified by the outcomes when the players
use pure strategies. If Alice plays D ⊂ R and Bob plays fixed a < b the
probability of correct guess is
p(a, b;D) :=

1
2
, if a ∈ D, b ∈ D,
1
2
, if a ∈ Dc, b ∈ Dc,
1, if a ∈ Dc, b ∈ D,
0, if a ∈ D, b ∈ Dc.
(7)
where 1/2 appears due to exchangeability of X, Y .
Although simple, the analysis of pure strategies gives some hints. Identi-
fying D with its indicator function
F (x) = 1(x ∈ D) (8)
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the entry 0 in (7) is the situation of inversion in F :
a < b, F (a) > F (b).
Inspecting (7) it is clear that D is minimax if and only if F has no inversions.
But such D is either D = ∅ or R or a right-tailed halfline, either (t,∞) or
[t,∞) for some t ∈ R.
Regarding the admissibility of pure strategies, we note that ifD is bounded
from the above, then this strategy is dominated by D˜ = D ∪ [supD,∞), be-
cause D˜ has less inversions, while other entries of (7) are the same as for
D. Likewise, if Dc is bounded from below, then D˜ = D \ (−∞, infDc)
dominates D. On the other hand, if supD = ∞, infDc = −∞ then D
cannot be dominated by a pure strategy. Indeed, suppose D˜ dominates
D. For a ∈ Dc, b ∈ D and a < x < b it holds that if x ∈ D then
1 = p(a, x;D) ≤ p(a, x, D˜) implies p(a, x, D˜) = 1, hence a ∈ D˜ c, x ∈ D˜.
If x ∈ Dc then 1 = p(x, b;D) ≤ p(x, b, D˜) implies p(x, b, D˜) = 1, and hence
x ∈ D˜ c, b ∈ D˜. It follows that the sets D and D˜ coincide between a and b,
and sending a→ −∞, b→∞ along D and Dc, respectively, we get D˜ = D.
It will be clear from what follows that this kind of argument still works when
a mixed strategy is taken in the role of D˜, thus a pure strategy D with
supD =∞, infDc = −∞ is admissible.
We may now conclude that
A pure guessing strategy is admissible and minimax if and only if the
decision set is either [t,∞) or (t,∞) for some t ∈ R.
Turning to randomised strategies, statistical decision theory suggests two
ways to introduce this concept:
(a) by mixing, that is spreading a probability measure over the set of pure
strategies,
(b) by means of a kernel, which for every x determines a distribution over
the set of possible actions.
The relation between these two approaches has been thoroughly discussed,
see e.g. [20] and references therein. In the context of the guessing game, the
approach (a) specialises as a random decision set D ⊂ R. To define a kernel
as in (b) we need just one function F : R → [0, 1] specifying probabilities
F (x) and 1−F (x) of two actions ‘accept x’ and ‘reject x’ (respectively) when
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the number x is observed. To link (a) to (b), with random set D we associate
the coverage function [23]
F (x) := P (x ∈ D), x ∈ R,
which defines a kernel. We say that two random sets are equivalent if they
have the same coverage function. Note that the idea of equivalence class
leaves open alternative concepts of a strategy associated with given F .
If Bob can only use integer numbers, then with every F : Z → [0, 1]
we can associate a random set by means of a Bernoulli process, that is by
including x in D with probability F (x), independently for all x ∈ Z. For
the game on reals the analogous construction will lead to a set which is not
measurable, hence the connection between (a) and (b) is more subtle.
To avoid annoying complications we shall assume that F is cadlag, that
is right-continuous with left limits. The instance of randomised threshold
strategy neatly fits in the random set framework: in this case D = [T,∞),
and since x ∈ D means the same as T ≤ x the coverage function is the cumu-
lative distribution function (4) of the random threshold T . To avoid separate
treatment of blind-guessing strategies it will be convenient to consider them
as special cases of the threshold strategy, with −∞ and ∞ being legitimate
values for the threshold. A threshold strategy with P (T = ±∞) = 0 will be
called proper, hence satisfying
lim
x→−∞
F (x) = 0, lim
x→∞
F (x) = 1. (9)
When Bob plays exchangeable X, Y with some given joint distribution
and Alice uses D with some coverage function F the outcome of the game is
assessed as
P (win) = E [1(X > Y )F (X) + 1(Y > X)(1− F (X))] =
E[1(X > Y )F (X) + 1(Y > X)− 1(Y > X)F (X)] =
1
2
+ E [1(X > Y )F (X)− 1(X > Y )F (Y )] =
1
2
+ E [1(X > Y ){F (X ∨ Y )− F (X ∧ Y )}] =
1
2
+
1
2
E{F (X ∨ Y )− F (X ∧ Y )}, (10)
where ∨,∧ denote maximum and minimum, respectively. The passage to the
third line is justified by exchangeability. The last line follows by the following
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observation: for symmetric function ϕ from 1(X > Y ) + 1(Y > X) = 1 and
exchangeability we have
E[(1(X > Y )ϕ(X, Y )] = E[(1(Y > X)ϕ(X, Y )] =
1
2
E[ϕ(X, Y )].
At a first glance, formula (10) may seem to disagree with (7), as the aver-
aging will apparently involve more complex two-point coverage probabilities
P (a ∈ D, b ∈ D). However, re-writing (7) as
p(a, b;D) =
1
2
+
1
2
1(a ∈ Dc, b ∈ D)−
1
2
· 1(a ∈ D, b ∈ Dc) =
1
2
+
1
2
· [1(b ∈ D)− 1(a ∈ D, b ∈ D)]−
1
2
[1(a ∈ D)− 1(a ∈ D, b ∈ D)] =
1
2
+
1
2
[1(b ∈ D)− 1(a ∈ D)],
and averaging over the realisations of the random decision set, for the winning
probability with D against pure strategy a < b we obtain
P (win) =
1
2
+
1
2
(F (b)− F (a)) (11)
in accord with (10). In particular, for threshold strategy (10) becomes (3).
By the analogy with the threshold case, we call general D proper, if the
coverage function satisfies (9).
It is very fortunate that probability (11) is expressible via such a simple
characteristics of D. It is immediate from the formula that
(i-a) A mixed strategy D is minimax if and only if the coverage function F
is nondecreasing,
(i-b) A mixed strategy D strongly dominates blind-guessing if and only if
the coverage function F is strictly increasing.
In particular, every threshold strategy with fully supported T , possibly with
atoms at±∞ (blind-guessing component), is winning with probability strictly
greater than 1/2. A more interesting example, stepping away from threshold
strategies is the following.
Example F Let T be a fully supported random variable with (strictly in-
creasing) cumulative distribution function F , possibly not proper. With T
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we associate both the threshold strategy, and a dual strategy which accepts
x when x is smaller than the sample value of T . The decision set for the
dual strategy is (−∞, T ), and the coverage function is 1−F . For 0 ≤ γ < 1
define a (F, γ)-strategy as a mixture of the threshold strategy and its dual
with weights γ and 1 − γ. The coverage function for the (F, γ)-strategy is
the convex combination
Fγ(x) = γF (x) + (1− γ)(1− F (x)).
Clearly, the (F, γ)-strategy is not of threshold type because with probability
1− γ the decision set is a left-tailed half-line. We have then for a < b
P (win) =
1
2
+
1
2
(Fγ(b)− Fγ(a)) =
1
2
+
2γ − 1
2
(F (b)− F (a)),
which exceeds 1/2 for γ > 1/2.
We turn to the admissibility of mixed guessing strategies. A simple suf-
ficient condition is
(ii-a) If D has a proper coverage function F then D is admissible.
Indeed, suppose F is proper and F˜ is a coverage function for some strategy,
such that F˜ (b)− F˜ (a) ≥ F (b)−F (a) for all a < b. Sending a→ −∞, b→∞
we get F˜ (b) − F˜ (a) → 1, which is only possible when F˜ is also proper.
Therefore letting a → −∞ yields F˜ (b) ≥ F (b), and letting b → ∞ yields
1− F˜ (a) ≥ 1− F (a). Since a < b arbitrary we have F = F˜ , hence F˜ cannot
dominate F .
Without engaging in fuller analysis of admissibility, as a partial converse
to (ii-a) we have
(ii-b) If D has coverage function F with lim inf
x→−∞
F (x) > 0 or lim sup
x→∞
F (x) < 1
(so, not proper) then D is dominated.
Indeed, the increments will be only bigger, if we increase F on some halfline
[x,∞) by a constant, or decrease on some (−∞, x) by a constant.
If F is not proper and nondecreasing (but not constant), we can dominate
D by any D˜ with coverage function
F˜ (x) =
F (x)− c1
c2 − c1
,
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where c1 = limx→−∞ F (x) and c2 = limx→∞ F (x). For instance, the (F, γ)-
strategy from Example F is dominated by the threshold strategy with T
distributed according to F ; the dominance is strong if T is fully supported.
If the coverage function F is constant, then D performs like a blind-
guessing strategy, hence D is not admissible. Constant F appears as a cov-
erage function for a stationary (translation invariant) random set D.
Example G Let P be the random set of atoms of a homogeneous Poisson
point process with rate λ. A realisation of the process is a random scatter
of isolated points (atoms). Define a decision set as the pointwise sum of sets
D = P+[0, 1], which is the union of unit intervals having left endpoints in P.
A point x is uncovered by D with probability e−λ, as this occurs whenever
P has no atoms in [x − 1, x], The coverage function is therefore constant
F (x) = 1− e−λ, hence this strategy always wins with probability 1/2.
Instead of building upon a Poisson process, one can use any stationary
renewal point process, expressing F via the distribution of the age (also
known as backward excess) random variable.
Every cadlag nondecreasing F with values in [0, 1] is a distribution func-
tion for some random variable, hence the coverage function for a threshold
strategy. Putting this together with (i-b), (ii-a) and (ii-b) we arrive at a
crucial conclusion
(ii-c) A guessing strategy D is superminimax if and only if the coverage
function F is strictly increasing and proper. In this case D is equivalent
to the threshold strategy with T having the cumulative distribution
function F .
We give a construction of superminimax strategies not of the threshold
type.
Example H For λ a positive locally integrable function on R, consider a
(inhomogeneous) Poisson point process P of intensity λ. Define D = P +
[0, 1]. With positive probability the set D has many connected components,
hence this is not a threshold strategy. The coverage function is computed as
F (x) = 1− e−Λ(x), where Λ(x) =
∫ x
x−1
λ(t)dt is the mean number of Poisson
atoms in [x − 1, x]. To get a proper strictly increasing F , it is enough to
require that λ be increasing, with limits at ±∞ being 0 and ∞, respectively.
To meet these conditions we can take the intensity function λ(t) = et.
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Finally, we comment on the game on Z. If Bob is restricted to use only
integer numbers the above arguments simplify in that there are no longer
measurability and continuity concerns. A random set D ⊂ Z can be identified
with a 0-1 process on the lattice. The simplest such process is homogeneous
Bernoulli, which is equivalent to the blind guessing. Borrowing an idea from
the interacting particle systems [22] and the theory of generalised exchange-
ability [16] a superminimax strategy can be constructed as a q-deformation
of the Bernoulli process, as in the following example.
Example I There exists a random bijection Σ : Z → Z with the following
property. For every n, and a subset S ⊂ Z with 2n + 1 elements, given that
the (unordered) set of values of Σ|[−n,n] is S, with probability proportional
to qI the bijection Σ|[−n,n] → S coincides with any of (2n + 1)! bijections
σ : [−n, n] → S where I is the number of inversions in σ. We can view Σ as
an infinite analogue of the Mallows model for finite random permutations,
see [16] for details. The decision set will be defined as D = {j : Σ(j) ≥ 0}.
The indicator function of D may be thought of as configuration of ‘particles’
occupying some positions on the lattice. This configuration is obtained by
using Σ to shuffle the initial configuration where particles occupy positions
j ≥ 0 while positions j < 0 are the ‘holes’. For 0 < q < 1 the bijection
Σ tends to be increasing, and D has the decisive property that the pattern
‘hole, particle’ in positions a < b is more likely than ‘particle, hole’; thus D
is a superminimax strategy. The random configuration D is an equilibrium
state (also known as ‘blocking measure’) for asymmetric simple exclusion
process [22].
3.6 Repeated game
The objective interpretation of probability involves the long-run frequency
in a series of identical trials. Thus speaking of probability of an outcome
in the guessing game we actually that the game is played in many rounds,
and that each player employs the same randomisation device in every round.
In the time perspective, the latter means that the strategies are stationary.
Considering the guessing game as a repeated game [28], we may allow playing
nonstationary strategies, by changing randomisation method from round to
round. The long run frequency of wins is a natural objective for the guessing
player. A solution to repeated game exists in stationary strategies if the
basic (stage) zero-sum game has a solution. But in the guessing game Bob
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has only epsilon-minimax strategies, therefore it perfectly makes sense to use
nonstationary strategies for writing the numbers, in each successive round
making guessing harder. For instance, Bob will bound the long-run frequency
of Alice’s wins by exactly 1/2 by employing the uniform distribution on the
finite set (6) in round m. Then, in terms of the long run frequency, the
strategy of blind guessing cannot be outperformed, and the repeated game
has a solution.
3.7 B. Hill’s assumption and the invariance principle
An ideal strategy for Bob is exchangeable pair X, Y without ties satisfying
P (π(X) = 1/2) = 1. This condition is the n = 1 instance of assumption
An introduced by Bruce Hill [17] as a model for nonparametric predictive
inference. He used threshold comparison to show that A1 and then, by in-
duction, An is impossible. But Lane and Sudderth [21] showed that An can
be realised in the setting of finitely additive probability theory, which leads
to a kind of unconventional minimax strategy for Bob.
The uniform distribution on (6) with large m can be regarded as approx-
imation to A1. It is instructive to represent this strategy as
X = B +G1, Y = B +G2, (12)
where the pair G1, G2 is exchangeable, and independent of the location pa-
rameter B. Using the additive form many other approximations to A1, hence
good strategies for Bob can be constructed. More insight comes from the sta-
tistical Principle of Invariance which asserts existence of invariant minimax
strategy in decision problem with certain group of symmetries.
Example J Consider the game on Z with a further constraint that Bob must
use two consequtive integers. A pure strategy for Bob amounts to choosing
the location parameter β ∈ Z, to play exchangeable X = β+G1, Y = β+G2,
where G1, G2 is the pair 0, 1 arranged in random order. The group Z acts in
this setting by translations and is admissible (cf [2], Definition 8.6.2). The
latter means that, for all β, x ∈ Z when Bob plays pure strategy β and Alice
plays a strategy which accepts a given x as the larger number when x is
observed, the outcome is the same as in the game where Bob plays β+ z and
Alice accepts x+ z when x+ z is observed. Since Z acts transitively on the
range of observed variable, any invariant minimax strategy must be constant,
hence it is blind guessing. Uniform distribution on {−m, . . . ,m} (for big m)
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is Bob’s epsilon-minimax strategy, which may be regarded as approximation
to the ideal strategy for Bob, the latter being the infinite invariant measure
on Z.
Example E (continued) Suppose G1, G2 in (12) is the pair of numbers 0, 1
arranged in random order, and that B takes values in the group 3Z of integer
multiples of 3. Alice’s invariant minimax strategy is constant on the orbits
{3j : j ∈ Z} and {3j + 1 : j ∈ Z}, and it is the sure-fire strategy which
accepts x = 3j + 1 and rejects x = 3j.
Example K To approximate A1 by continuous distributions we can take
X = B + U1, Y = B + U2 , (13)
where B is uniformly distributed on [−m,m] and independent of U1, U2,
and the variables U1, U2 are iid uniform on [0, 1]. Similarly to (12), taking
m big we achieve that π(X) = 1/2 with high probability, and this yields a
epsilon-minimax strategy for Bob in the game where he controls a continuous
location parameter β ∈ R. The value of this game is 1/2. The advantage of
using (13) , as compared to discrete distributions, is that X, Y is a mixture
of iid sequences, hence can be extended to an infinite sequence B + Ui of
exchangeable random variables. A version of the Game of Googol for such
location mixtures was studied in [24].
Example L Yet another approximation to A1 is obtained via the multiplica-
tive form
X = AU1, Y = AU2, (14)
where A is a positive scaling parameter independent of uniform iid U1, U2.
This can be interpreted in context of the game where Bob only controls the
scaling parameter. To have E|π(X)−1/2| small, one can take A with density
P (A ∈ [a, a + da]) =
1
2 logm
da
a
, m−1 < a < m,
which may be seen as a finite approximation to the invariant measure on the
multiplicative group R+.
Scale mixtures of uniform distributions, based on another approximation
to the invariant measure on R+, will play important role in the remaining
part of the paper.
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4 The two piles game
4.1 Setup
We focus next on a game that bears features of asymmetric two-cards game,
the Game of Googol with n cards and the game with two sequences from [30].
Bob takes n separate cards and on each writes a different number. The deck
is shuffled and dealt face down in two piles of k and n − k cards. The pile
sizes are known to both players. Alice collects the pile with k cards, looks
at the numbers and guesses if the number largest of all n numbers is in her
hand or in the other pile with n− k cards. She wins if her guess is right.
We model Bob’s strategy as a joint probability distribution for n ran-
dom variables Z1, . . . , Zn which do not tie, i.e. P (Zi = Zj) = 0 for i 6= j,
and are exchangeable. Exchangeability is equivalent to the property that
the sequences . . . , Zi, Zi+1, . . . and . . . , Zi+1, Zi, . . . with just two neighbours
swapped have the same joint distribution.
The numbers z1, . . . , zk in Alice’s hand will be identified with values of
random variables Z1, . . . , Zk, and the hidden numbers in the second pile with
values of Zk+1, . . . , Zn. Using ∨ for ‘maximum’ let X = Z1 ∨ . . . ∨ Zk and
Y = Zk+1 ∨ . . . ∨ Zn be the respective maxima in piles. Having observed
z1, . . . , zk, Alice’s dilemma amounts to guessing which of the inequalities
x > y and x < y is true for the values x, y of X, Y , respectively.
The setting is similar to the game with two cards, but there are two
delicate distinctions. Firstly, Bob determines the joint distribution of X, Y
indirectly, via the joint distribution of Z1, . . . , Zn. Secondly, Alice has more
information when observing Z1, . . . , Zk as compared to just learning the max-
imum of these k variables. Her best-response strategy is to decide that x > y
if
P (X > Y |Z1 = z1, . . . , Zk = zk) ≥
1
2
, (15)
where, in general, the conditional probability depends on all z1, . . . , zk in a
complex way. For tractability reasons it will be useful to find a framework
where this probability is expressible in terms of a few summary statistics of
the observed numbers.
By exchangeability,
P (X > Y ) =
k
n
,
because each Zj is equally likely to be the largest of all n numbers. We call
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the game symmetric if the deck is split evenly (n even, k = n/2).
If the game is symmetric, X and Y are themselve exchangeable. Like in
the two-cards game, a threshold strategy dominates the blind guessing. One
might anticipate that the value of the game is still 1/2, but the tools we used
to show this in the two-cards game are not appropriate for n > 2.
In the asymmetric game the pile of bigger size is more likely to contain the
overall largest number. Under ‘blind guessing’ we shall understand Alice’s
strategy which always decides on the larger pile, regardless of the revealed
numbers. Since on the average E[P (X > Y |Z1, . . . , Zk)] = k/n 6= 1/2, we
may hope to find a joint distribution for Z1, . . . , Zn, such that the conditional
probability is always within ǫ from the constant k/n, hence compares to 1/2
in the same way as k/n does. This would also imply the same kind of definite
relation between X and the conditional median of Y given Z1, . . . , Zk. For
such Bob’s strategy the blind guessing would be Alice’s best response.
4.2 The game with independent numbers
Suppose Bob plays iid Z1, . . . , Zn with uniform distribution on [0, 1], and
Alice plays her best-response (Bayesian) strategy. For x = z1 ∨ . . . ∨ zk,
condition (15) becomes P (Y < x) ≥ 1/2, which holds exactly for x ≥ µ,
where threshold µ is the median of Y .
From P (X < x) = P (Z1 < x, . . . , Zk < x) = x
k the density function of
X is kxk−1 for x ∈ [0, 1]. From
1
2
= P (Y < µ) = P (Zk+1 ≤ µ, . . . , Zn ≤ µ) = µ
n−k
the median is µ = 2−1/(n−k). The optimal probability of win is computed as
v = P (X > Y,X > µ) + P (X < Y,X < µ)
=
∫ 1
µ
xn−k · kxk−1dx+
∫ µ
0
(1− xn−k)kxk−1dx
=
k
n
+ µk +
2k
n
µn ,
which upon substituting the median gives
v =
k
n
+
(
1−
k
n
)
2−k/(n−k) . (16)
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For symmetric games k/n = 1/2, and we arrive at v = 3/4 in accord with
our previous computation for the two-cards game.
Observe that v is a function of the ratio k/n. This is easy to explain
using the invariance of the game under monotonic transformations of the
number scale. For increasing function ϕ : (0, 1)→ R, the change of variables
ϕ(Z1), . . . , ϕ(Zn) yields an equivalent game, since ϕ preserves the order rela-
tions. Arbitrary continuous distribution for the random variable ϕ(Zi) can
be obtained from uniformly distributed Zi. In the iid case, the game with
pile sizes ℓk, ℓ(n − k) is reducible to the game with pile sizes k, n − k by
passing to n iid variables Z ′i = Zℓ(i−1)+1 ∨ . . . ∨ Zℓi (i = 1, . . . , n) and noting
that Z1 ∨ . . . ∨ Zℓk = Z
′
1 ∨ . . . ∨ Z
′
k and similarly for the other pile.
Minimising v as function of k/n, the ratio worst for Alice is about 0.587,
with minimum v being close to 0.741. On the other hand, the maximum 1
is achieved for k/n→ 0 or 1.
4.3 A class of multivariate densities
Multivariate distributions well suited for our purposes have densities the form
fn(z1, . . . , zn) = gn(z1 ∨ . . . ∨ zn), (17)
where zj > 0 for j = 1, . . . , n and gn is a nonnegative function. Random
variables Z1, . . . , Zn with joint density fn are exchangeable because the max-
imum z1 ∨ . . . ∨ zn is a symmetric function. The total probability integral
must be one, therefore gn must satisfy∫
∞
0
. . .
∫
∞
0
fn(z1, . . . , zn)dz1 . . . dzn =
n
∫
∞
0
gn(z1)dz1
∫ z1
0
. . .
∫ z1
0
dz2 . . . dzn =
n
∫
∞
0
gn(t)t
n−1dt = 1. (18)
For k < n the joint density of Z1, . . . , Zk is obtained by integrating out
the variables zk+1, . . . , zn as
fk(z1, . . . , zk) =
∫
∞
0
. . .
∫
∞
0
gn(x ∨ zk+1 ∨ · · · ∨ zn)dzk+1 . . . dzn =
xn−kgn(x) + (n− k)
∫
∞
x
yn−k−1gn(y)dy =: gk(x), (19)
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where gk, similarly to gn, is a function of maximum x = z1 ∨ . . . ∨ zk. The
conditional joint density of Zk+1, . . . , Zn at locations zk+1, . . . , zn given the
observed numbers Z1 = z1, . . . , Zk = zk becomes gn(x ∨ y)/gk(x), where
y = zk+1 ∨ . . . ∨ zn. Integrating out zk+1, . . . , zn, with each variable running
from 0 to x, we arrive at
P (X > Y |Z1 = z1, . . . , Zk = zk) = P (Y < x|X = x) =
xn−kgn(x)
gk(x)
=: πn,k(x). (20)
The rationale behind (17) can be now appreciated. The conditional den-
sity of Y given Z1 = z1, . . . , Zk = zk depends only on the maximum x of the
observed numbers. In this sense we are back to the two-cards problem with
certain class of bivariate distributions for X, Y .
4.4 Scale mixtures of uniform distributions
We want to find a function gn for which πn,k(x) is close to the constant k/n
for all x > 0. An ideal candidate is gn(x) = nx
−n as (20) gives πn,k(x) = k/n
exactly. But this function cannot be used to define a proper density (17)
since the integral in (18) diverges. In what follows we will find a proper
deformation of the power function.
An important subclass of multivariate densities (17) is the family of scale
mixtures of uniform distributions, which we now introduce. Let U1, U2, . . .
be iid uniform on [0, 1], and let A be a positive random variable, independent
of Uj ’s. Consider an infinite exchangeable sequence
Zj = AUj , j = 1, 2, . . . (21)
Suppose A has density h on the positive halfline. Given A = a, the variables
Z1, . . . , Zn are iid, uniform on [0, a], hence their (unconditional) joint density
is of the form (17) with
gn(x) =
∫
∞
x
a−nh(a)da, n = 1, 2, . . . (22)
It is not hard to check that this formula agrees with (19) for k < n. Con-
versely, if gn is a nonnegative function satisfying (18) and g
′
n ≤ 0 then
fn is the n-dimensional density for (21) with variable A having density
h(a) = −g′n(a)a
n, a > 0. See more in [13] on this connection.
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Observe that for the improper distribution with density h(a) = a−1, a > 0
formula (22) yields the ideal function gn(x) = nx
−n.
To achieve convergence we take a piecewise smooth density
h(a) =
{
c a−δ−1, for a ≥ 1,
c aδ−1, for 0 < a < 1,
(23)
with 0 < δ < 1 yet to be chosen and c = 2δ−1. Then the integral (22) is
easily calculated as
gn(x) =
{
c
n+δ
x−n−δ , for x ≥ 1,
c
n−δ
x−n+δ − 2cδ
n2−δ2
, for 0 < x < 1,
(24)
where for the second part we used the decomposition
gn(x) =
∫ 1
x
a−n(caδ−1)da+ gn(1).
Now a part of (20) is straight from the first part of (24)
πn,k(x) =
k + δ
n + δ
, for x ≥ 1, (25)
and similarly with slightly more effort the other part becomes
πn,k(x) =
k − δ
(
1 + 2(k−δ)
n+δ
xk−δ
)
n− δ
(
1 + 2(n−δ)
k+δ
xk−δ
) , for 0 < x < 1. (26)
From (25) and (26) we see that for every integer N and given positive ǫ < 1/N
it is possible to choose δ > 0 so small that∣∣∣∣πn,k(x)− kn
∣∣∣∣ < ǫ
holds uniformly in x > 0 and 1 ≤ k ≤ n ≤ N . With this choice of param-
eter πn,k relates to 1/2 exactly as k/n does, unless k = n/2. But then the
distribution of Z1, . . . , Zn defined by (17) and (24) has the properties that
(i) for k > n/2 the optimal Alice’s counter-strategy is to always accept
the maximum of the first pile x,
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(ii) for k < n/2 the optimal Alice’s counter-strategy is to always reject x,
(iii) for k = n/2 the optimal Alice’s counter-strategy wins with probability
at most 1/2 + ǫ.
It follows that the value of the two-pile game is max(k/n, 1− k/n), and that
a blind guessing is the minimax strategy in asymmetric game. 4
To practically implement the strategy defined by (17), (24) Bob needs
to simulate a sample value a (possibly with the aid of techniques from [9]),
use a standard uniform random numbers generator for n values ui, and set
zi = aui. To play the best-response strategy in the Bayesian game Alice may
calculate the posterior distribution of the unknown scale parameter using the
observed x = z1 ∨ . . . ∨ zk, but this update cannot help improving upon the
blind guessing in the asymmetric game, and will give only a minor advantage
in the symmetric one.
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